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I. INTRODUCTION 
The neoclassical economics system assumes that individuals, acting 
on the basis of rational self-interest, will acquire the “perfect” 
knowledge needed to make decisions, that individuals will respond 
rationally to changes in “price,” that distributional consequences can be 
ignored in setting laws since losses can be made up through taxes and 
transfer payments, and that it is enough that parties theoretically could 
compensate third parties for their losses out of the gains from choices 
they make.
1
 None of these assumptions holds particularly true in the 
complex systems of families, as the data will show. 
* Margaret F. Brinig is the Fritz Duda Family Chair in Law, University of Notre Dame.
1. Kaldor-Hicks efficiency criteria were suggested in 1939 by Nicholas Kaldor, Welfare 
Propositions in Economics and Interpersonal Comparisons of Utility, 49 ECON. J. 549 (1939) and 
J.R. Hicks, The Foundations of Welfare Economics, 49 ECON. J. 696 (1939). While it is accepted by 
many legal academics, see Richard Posner, Utilitarianism, Economics, and Legal Theory, 8 J. 
LEGAL STUD. 103 (1979), it is criticized by the Austrian school of economics. See, e.g., Edward 
Stringham, Kaldor-Hicks Efficiency and the Problem of Central Planning, 4 Q.J. AUST. ECON. 41 
(2001). 
1
Brinig: Result Inequality in Family Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2015
472 AKRON LAW REVIEW [49:471 
Turning to the legal side, the Constitution, especially since the 
enactment of the Fourteenth Amendment, constrains lawmakers to treat 
every person equally. Despite claims during the 1970s that inequalities 
in results produced by facially neutral statutes violated the Constitution, 
the Supreme Court has upheld legislation that permits unequal funding 
levels for public education
2
 or that allows family size caps on welfare 
payments.
3
 In a free market economy, wealth can purchase better 
education or legal services so long as the basic rights guaranteed to all 
are available. Thus, just as the basic right of voting cannot be relegated 
to those who can pay a poll tax,
4
 access to divorce cannot be based on 
payment of a filing fee,
5
 nor may the ability to marry be conditioned on 
payment of previously ordered child support.
6
 
Of course, public policy about family law, public assistance, and 
education has changed over forty years. Importantly, there is a 
recognition that while basic rights to control and direct the upbringing of 
children belong to their fit parents,
7
 when parents’ and children’s 
interests conflict (or the child’s and one parent’s conflicts with the 
other’s), the children’s must triumph.8 Of the many recent changes in 
family law, one of the most contentious
9
 is the legislative insistence that 
custody be shared between separating parents.
10
 
Family demographics have changed as well, from a dominant 
model of two-parent, married, intact families to a substantial number of 
children being raised by never-married or divorced parents. For some 
2. San Antonio Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 24 (1973) (involving an 
unsuccessful challenge to Texas’ school funding system based on local property taxes, since the 
students were not absolutely deprived of the desired benefit, stating that “[a]t least where wealth is 
involved, the Equal Protection Clause does not require absolute equality or precisely equal 
advantages”). 
3. Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 473-75, 478-80 (1970). 
4. Harper v. Virginia State Bd. of Elections, 383 U.S. 663 (1966).
5. Sosna v. Iowa, 419 U.S. 393 (1975).
6. Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374 (1978).
7. See Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65 (2000) (holding that an unwed mother could 
determine visitation rights of children’s paternal grandparents after his death, stating that “[t]he 
liberty interest at issue in this case—the interest of parents in the care, custody, and control of their 
children—is perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests recognized by this Court”). 
8. See Elk Grove Unified Sch. Dist. v. Newdow, 542 U.S 1, 12, 15 (2004) (determining that 
there was no standing for a noncustodial father who lacked legal custody to attack constitutionality 
of “under God” provision of Pledge of Allegiance on behalf of his daughter). “What makes this case 
different is that Newdow’s standing derives entirely from his relationship with his daughter . . . the 
interests of this parent and this child are not parallel, and indeed, are potentially in conflict.” Id. 
9. See, e.g., Elizabeth S. Scott & Robert E. Emery, Gender Politics and Child Custody: The 
Puzzling Persistence of the Best-Interests Standard, 77 L. & CONTEMP. PROBS. 69, 72-73 (2014). 
10. Marsha Kline Pruett & J. Herbie DiFonzo, Closing the Gap: Research, Policy, Practice 
and Shared Parenting, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 152, 156-57 (2014). 
2
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subpopulations, non-married families are the norm. Further, the children 
raised by single parents are disadvantaged compared to others, though 
whether as an outgrowth of poverty or the lack of influence of the 
noncustodial parent is debated. Over the last half-century, social 
scientists have recognized that both poverty and household patterns 
replicate over generations. 
June Carbone and Naomi Cahn argued recently
11
 that marriage 
works well for couples at the upper third of income levels, poorly for 
those in the middle class, and is not attempted by most in the bottom 
third. They argue that the significant benefits gained by marriage, 
including stability, should not be abandoned (as is suggested by some),
12
 
but that the economy will need restructuring before many in the lower 
classes do take on marriage. This seems particularly true for families of 
color.
13
 
While society may tolerate inequality among adults, if law itself 
causes replication of unfavorable outcomes for children, this is a great 
cause for concern. While academics have observed that shared custody 
tends to be more prevalent for wealthy couples,
14
 and that mediation 
leads to shared custody more often than does the traditional legal 
process,
15
 little research has been done on the impact of shared custody 
on domestic violence,
16
 on the impact of shared parenting on poverty,
17
 
11. JUNE CARBONE & NAOMI CAHN, MARRIAGE MARKETS: HOW INEQUALITY IS REMAKING 
THE AMERICAN FAMILY (Oxford University Press 2014). 
12. Maxine S. Eichner, Marriage and the Elephant: The Liberal Democratic State’s 
Regulation of Intimate Relationships Between Adults, 30 HARV. J.L. & GENDER 25, 48-49, 54 
(2007); Cynthia Bowman, The New Family: Challenges to American Family Law, 22 CHILD & 
FAM. L.Q. 387 (2010); MARTHA A. FINEMAN, THE NEUTERED MOTHER, THE SEXUAL FAMILY, AND 
OTHER TWENTIETH CENTURY TRAGEDIES (1995). 
13. See, e.g., RALPH RICHARD BANKS, IS MARRIAGE FOR WHITE PEOPLE? HOW THE 
AFRICAN AMERICAN MARRIAGE DECLINE AFFECTS EVERYONE (2011). The general point is made 
by Sara McLanahan, Fragile Families and the Reproduction of Poverty, 621 ANNALS AM. ACAD. 
POL. & SOC. SCI. 111, 116-117 (2009) that not just race-specific, but class-based phenomenon of 
unmarried parents exist, which is replicated through partnership instability and multi-partnered 
fertility. Sara McLanahan, Fragile Families and the Reproduction of Poverty, 621 ANNALS AM. 
ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 111, 116-17 (2009); see also W. Bradford Wilcox & Nicholas H. 
Wolfinger, Then Comes Marriage? Religion, Race, and Marriage in Urban America, 36 SOC. SCI. 
RES. 569-89 (2007). 
14. See, e.g., Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown, Exploring A New Family Form—The 
Shared Time Family, 22 INT’L . J.L. POL’Y & FAM. 231 (2008). 
15. See, e.g., Trina Grillo, The Mediation Alternative: Process Dangers for Women, 100 
YALE L.J. 1545, 1582-83, 1587-88 (1991). But see Suzanne Reynolds, Catherine T. Harris & Ralph 
A. Peeples, Back to the Future: An Empirical Study of Child Custody Outcomes, 85 N.C. L. REV. 
1629, 1631-32, 1638, 1644, 1649-51, 1667-69 (2007). 
16. However, there is some available research on domestic violence and shared parenting. 
See literature cited in Margaret F. Brinig, Leslie Drozd & Loretta Frederick, Perspectives on Joint 
Custody Parenting as Applied to Domestic Violence Cases, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 272 (2014). See also 
3
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or on racial or ethnic disparities in custody patterns.
18
 This Article 
attempts to answer some of these questions, concluding that the actual 
picture of family dissolution and its aftermath diverges dramatically 
based on income, marital status, and race. Further, children of divorce 
tend to delay marriage longer, marry less often, and divorce more 
frequently than children of intact families.
19
 The conclusion is that 
current law in fact drives some of the least attractive aspects of the 
picture of family dissolution, and that replication into future generations 
suggests that some changes need to be made immediately. 
This Article evaluates data from Arizona, where there is a statutory 
presumption of shared parenting or equal parenting time for all 
separating couples, and data from Indiana, where the state’s guidelines 
suggest “meaningful contact” with both parents, based on the age of the 
child. The data I examine suggests that requiring equal parenting time 
for all couples leads to inequality based on income,
20
 marital status,
21
 
race and ethnicity,
22
 and in instances of domestic violence.
23
 I, therefore, 
Nancy Ver Steegh & Gabrielle Davis, Calculating Safety: Reckoning with Domestic Violence in the 
Context of Child Support Parenting Time Initiatives, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 279 (2015) (theoretical 
rather than empirical). 
17. See, e.g., Jessica Pearson, Establishing Parenting Time in Child Support Cases: New 
Opportunities and Challenges, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 246, 252-54 (2015); Jay Fagan & Rebecca 
Kaufman, Co-Parenting among Low-Income, Unmarried Parents: Perspectives of Fathers in 
Fatherhood Programs, 53 FAM. CT. REV. 304, 305, 312 (2015). A recent article suggests the 
connection between co-parenting and low income fathers’ monetary contributions to their children, 
especially informal payments. Julia S. Goldberg, Coparenting and Nonresident Fathers’ Monetary 
Contributions to Their Children, 77 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 612, 612 (2015)  
18. Solangel Maldonado, Deadbeat or Deadbroke: Redefining Child Support For Poor 
Fathers, 39 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 991, 995, 1003-04, 1006-08 (2006). 
19. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven L. Nock, “I Only Want Trust”: Norms, Trust and 
Autonomy, 32 J. SOC. ECON. 471, 483-84 (2003); Casey E. Copen et al., First Marriages in the 
United States: Data from the 2006-2010 National Survey of Family Growth, 49 National Health 
Statistics Reports, U.S. DEP’T HEALTH & HUMAN SERVICES, 1, 7, 12, 14 (March 12, 2012) 
(likelihood of divorcing, page 7; marrying, page 12 and Table 1; marrying older at 14 and Table 3, 
all based on presence or absence of both parents in household at age fourteen), 
http://www.cdc.gov/nchs/data/nhsr/nhsr049.pdf. 
20. Jonathan Vespe et al., America’s Families and Living Arrangements: 2012, U.S. CENSUS 
BUREAU 3, 7 (2013), http://www.census.gov/prod/2013pubs/p20-570.pdf. 
21. Id.; see also, SARA S. MCLANAHAN & GARY SANDEFUR, GROWING UP WITH A SINGLE 
PARENT: WHAT HURTS, WHAT HELPS (1994); Jay Fagan & Mollie Cherson, Maternal Gatekeeping: 
The Associations Among Facilitation, Encouragement and Low-Income Fathers’ Engagement with 
Young Children, 24 J. FAM. ISSUES 3-5, 16-17 (2015); Kwok Ho Chan, Ka Wei Terence Fung & 
Ender Demir, The Health and Behavior Outcomes of Out of Wedlock Children from Families of 
Social Fathers, 13 REV. ECON. HOUSEHOLD 385, 386, 389, 396 (2015). 
22. See, e.g., Pamela Attree, The Social Costs of Child Poverty: A Systematic Review of the 
Qualitative Evidence, 20 CHILD. & SOC. 54 (2006); Irwin Garfinkel & Afshin Zilanawola, Fragile 
Families in the American Welfare State, 55 CHILD. & YOUTH SERV. REV. 210 (2015).  
23. See, e.g., ROBERT D. PUTNAM, OUR KIDS: THE AMERICAN DREAM IN CRISIS (2015); 
4
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conclude that the state guidelines regarding parenting time should not 
impose equal parenting time in all situations, but should consider 
variations on any equal parenting presumption in at least the following 
situations: (1) cases involving the potential for domestic violence; (2) 
cases in which family incomes are in the lower half of family incomes; 
and (3) cases involving the breakup of unmarried, cohabitating couples. 
Additionally, the data suggest that child support guidelines should 
consider issues including duplication of resources in the shared 
parenting environment and the higher cost of raising children in two 
homes (and should ameliorate the disparity in living standards in the two 
homes). Further, the data suggest that policymakers should consider 
promoting childcare services and other in-kind services that promote 
contact with the noncustodial parent, in appropriate cases. 
Part II of this Article provides a short introduction to shared 
parenting policies from the 1980s to the present, the policies that have 
animated the move to equal sharing of parenting time, how states have 
varied in their approach to shared parenting time, and what we have yet 
to learn about shared parenting. Part III discusses how I selected Arizona 
and Indiana as the basis for the data in this article and what data I 
obtained and used in this study. Part III also presents the results I 
obtained regarding inequality in the shared parenting context based on 
income, marital status, race and ethnicity, and situations involving 
domestic violence. Part IV provides conclusions regarding when 
policymakers should think twice before creating a presumption of shared 
parenting and regarding changes in child support guidelines when shared 
parenting is implemented. 
II. A BRIEF OVERVIEW REGARDING FAMILY DISSOLUTION AND THE
SHARED PARENTING OPTION 
Shared parenting, though it appeared on the legislative scene in the 
early 1980s,
24
 has enjoyed a renaissance since the turn of the century.
25
 
JERE R. BEHRMA, ROBERT A. POLLAK & PAUL TAUBMAN, FROM PARENT TO CHILD: 
INTRAHOUSEHOLD ALLOCATIONS AND INTERGENERATIONAL RELATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES 
(1995); SAMUEL BOWLES, HERBERT GINTIS & MELISSA OSBORNE GROVES, UNEQUAL CHANGES: 
FAMILY BACKGROUND AND ECONOMIC SUCCESS (2005); SOCIAL CLASS AND CHANGING FAMILIES 
IN AN UNEQUAL AMERICA (Marcia J. Carlson & Paula England eds., 2011).  
24. See, e.g., Catherine R. Albiston, Eleanor E. Maccoby & Robert R. Mnookin, Does Joint 
Legal Custody Matter?, 2 STAN. L. & POL’Y REV. 167, 176 (1990) (changing the custody standard 
did not make an appreciable difference in actual, as opposed to court ordered, custody and visitation 
patterns). 
25. See, e.g., Maria Cancian, Daniel R. Meyer, Patricia R. Brown & Steven T. Clark, Who 
Gets Custody Now? Dramatic Changes in Children’s Living Arrangements After Divorce, 51 
5
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Since then, another round of joint custody presumption initiatives has 
been fomented by father’s rights groups, who have gained ground in 
some legislatures, notably in Arkansas,
26
 Arizona,
27
 Iowa,
28
 New 
Mexico
29
 and Wisconsin,
30
 as well as internationally.
31
 Because both 
parents, at least in theory, win
32
 and because judges need not make 
difficult binary custody determinations, shared parenting presumptions 
have been seen as vindicating parental rights, forcing parents to 
cooperate in the reconstituted family,
33
 and ensuring children the two-
DEMOGRAPHY 1381 (2014) (“These changes have accelerated markedly . . . between 1988 and 
2008 . . . . “). 
26. ARK CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. and 2015 1st 
Ex. Sess. of the 90th Ark. General Assembly). 
27. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and 
First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015). 
28. IOWA CODE ANN. § 598.41(1)(a) (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. 
Sess.). 
29. N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 (West, Westlaw through the end of the First Special Sess. of 
the 52nd Legis. 2015). 
30. WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act, published 08/13/2015).
31. How often it is actually used, and remains viable for parents, is another matter. For a 
chart illustrating the incidence of joint custody internationally, see Belinda Fehlberg et al., Caring 
for Children after Parental Separation: Would Legislation for Shared Parenting Help Children? 
Family Policy Briefing, 7 UNIVERSITY OF OXFORD DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL POLICY AND 
INTERVENTION 1, 4 (May 2011), available at http://www.nuffieldfoundation.org/
sites/default/files/files/Would%20legislation%20for%20shared%20parenting%20time%20help%20
children%29OXLAP%20FPB%207.pdf, (indicating 3.1% in the U.K. to 28% in Sweden). For some 
U.S. state experiences, see supra notes 26-30. There is a presumption, since 2006, in Australia that 
the best interests of the child is to have equal shared parenting responsibility, under the Family Law 
Act 1975 (Act No. 53, 1975) § 61DA (Austl.), and that the court must consider whether, if 
reasonably practicable and in the best interests of the child, to spend equal time, or failing that, 
significant and substantial time, with each parent. Section 65DAA defined as time allowing each 
parent to be involved in the child’s daily routine and significant events. Family Law Act 1975 (Act 
No. 53, 1975) § 65DAA(3). 
One recent British study found no evidence of parental alienation, but found some evidence of 
children deciding themselves, for their own reasons, not to have contact with their parents. JANE 
FORTIN, JOAN HUNT & LESLEY SCANLAN, TAKING A LONGER VIEW OF CONTACT: THE 
PERSPECTIVES OF YOUNG ADULTS WHO EXPERIENCED PARENTAL SEPARATION IN THEIR YOUTH 1, 
58-60 (Nov. 2012), 
www.sussex.ac.uk/law/research/centreforresponsibilities/takingalongerviewofcontact [hereinafter 
NUFFIELD REPORT] (three hundred ninety-eight adults 18-35 years old, interviewed by telephone, 
with fifty whose parents separated after the law changed in 1989 and who had contact with the non-
custodial parent, having face to face in-depth interviews). 
32. See, e.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Feminism and Child Custody Under Chapter Two of the 
American Law Institute’s Principles of the Law of Family Dissolution, 8 DUKE J. GENDER L. & 
POL’Y 301, 314 (2001). 
33. For some generally favorable consideration of the idea in principle, see Margaret F.
Brinig & F.H. Buckley, Joint Custody: Bonding and Monitoring Theories, 73 IND. L.J. 393 (1998). 
More recently, see ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD 
CUSTODY, AND MEDIATION (Guilford Press, 2d ed. 2012). 
6
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parent influence so many lack at parental dissolution.
34
 The shared, or 
34. See, e.g., Pruett & DiFonzio, supra note 10, at 159: 
Research has led to widespread agreement among professionals that children generally 
have improved prospects after separation and divorce when they have healthy, loving 
relationships with two parents before and after separation and divorce. Research has also 
soundly established that the multiple changes in home, school, neighborhood, and so on 
that often accompany separation and divorce are difficult for children and that continuity 
and consistency—especially in quality parenting and parent-child relationships—support 
child adaptation. In particular, studies have focused on the importance for children of 
their fathers staying involved after separation, as fathers are more likely than mothers to 
spend less time with or withdraw from their children after separation. 
For a recently adopted statute favoring both parenting plans and joint custody, see ARIZ. REV. STAT. 
ANN. § 25-403.02(B) (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and First Special Sess. of the 
52nd Legis. 2015) (“Consistent with the child’s best interests . . . the court shall adopt a parenting 
plan that provides for both parents to share legal decision-making regarding their child and that 
maximizes their respective parenting time.”); see also FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.13 (c) (West, Westlaw 
through the 2015 First Reg. Sess. and Special A Sess. of the 24th Legis.) (establishing for the statute 
as a whole, a presumption of substantial time with each as being in child’s best interests; section (3) 
establishes factors governing parenting plan); LA. REV. STAT. ANN. § 9:335 (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg. Sess.) (requiring courts to establish joint custody implementation order except 
for good cause shown, and provides that “to the extent it is feasible and in the best interest of the 
child, physical custody of the children should be shared equally”); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 40-4-9.1 
(West, Westlaw through the end of the First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015) (establishing a 
presumption that joint custody is in the child’s best interests but then sets forth factors and requires 
parenting plan; no specific time sharing arrangement required though time with each is to be 
“significant”). 
A recent attempt to enact a very strong presumption of joint custody, Senate Bill 1218, passed the 
legislature but was vetoed by Minnesota’s governor. In 2014, section 518.17, subdivision 2 of the 
Minnesota Statutes was amended to provide that there would be no presumption for or against joint 
physical custody except in cases of domestic abuse. A strong shared custody presumption in 
Michigan under House Bill 4120 progressed as far as the Committee on Judiciary. See Darrick 
Scott-Farnsworth, Michigan 2013-2014 HB 4120 Equal Parenting Rights Bill, EQUAL PARENTAL 
RIGHTS BLOG (Jan. 29, 2013, 1:32 PM), http://parentalrightsequality.blogspot.com/
2013/01/michigan-2013-14-hb-4120-equal.html; MI. 2013-2014 EQUAL PARENTING BILL HB 4120 
(last visited Feb. 5, 2016). In 2005, an equal time provision was introduced but died in committee in 
California. BILL DOCUMENTS, http://www.leginfo.ca.gov/cgi-
bin/postquery?bill_number=ab_1307&sess=0506&house=B&author=dymally (click on the 
hyperlink “Assembly Committee– 05/02/2005”). See also W. VA. SB 438 
(http://www.legis.state.wv.us/Bill_Text_HTML/2009_SESSIONS/RS/Bills/sb438%20intr.htm) 
(2009), discussed in Alison Knezevich, Sweeping Child-Custody Changes Proposed, THE 
CHARLESTON GAZETTE (Mar. 16, 2009), https://www.highbeam.com/doc/1P2-20002902.html 
(requiring court to order joint custody unless contrary to child’s interest). While Maine and Iowa 
have very strong presumptions, at least Iowa’s Supreme Court has decided that consistent with “best 
interests,” the legislature could not have enacted a joint physical custody presumption. ME. REV. 
STAT. ANN. tit. 19A, §1653(2)(A) (2009) (when parents agree to share parental rights); IOWA CODE 
§ 598.41(1)(a) (2013); In re Marriage of Hansen, 733 N.W.2d 683, 697 (Iowa 2007). For 
discussion, see IOWA FATHERS, http://www.iowafathers.com/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). The 
politics and public choice considerations for most of this legislation is discussed in Scott & Emery, 
supra note 9. 
In Great Britain, an equal custody bill was also defeated. See Tim Shipman, Fathers Lose Bid for 
Equal Custody Rights after Review of Family Law, DAILY MAIL (Nov. 2, 2011, 2:32 PM); see 
generally Alexander Masardo, Managing Shared Residence in Britain and France: Questioning a 
7
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alternating, custody rule—particularly in its strong form, the equal 
custody rule—has been a particular darling of interest groups concerned 
about the too real plight of noncustodial parents, especially fathers.
35
 As 
a “rights-based” approach, it has also gleaned support from some civil 
libertarians,
36
 and, early on, “sameness” feminists.37 On a slightly less 
exalted plain, because child support guidelines shift once a child spends 
Default ‘Primary Carer’ Model, 21 SOC. POL’Y REV 197 (Kirsten Rummery, Ian Greener & Chris 
Holden eds., 2009). For research justifying the bill’s defeat, see NUFFIELD REPORT, supra note 31, 
at xviii.  
In Australia, the measure achieved more success with 2006 legislation including the introduction of 
a presumption in favor of “equal shared parental responsibility,” Family Law Act 1975 (Act No. 53, 
1975) § 61DA(1), with a nexus between the application of the presumption and considerations in 
relation to time arrangements. Family Law Act § 65DAA. The presumption may be rebutted by 
evidence satisfying a court that it would not be in a child’s best interests for both parents to have 
equal shared parental responsibility. Family Law Act § 61DA(4), and it is not applicable where 
there are reasonable grounds to believe that a parent has engaged in child abuse or family violence. 
Family Law Act § 61DA(2). Where orders for shared parental responsibility are made pursuant to 
Family Law Act § 61DA(1), the courts are obliged to consider whether making orders for children 
to spend equal or substantial and significant time with each parent would be reasonably practicable 
and in the child’s best interests. Family Law Act § 65DAA. For a discussion, see Ruth Weston et 
al., Shared Care Time: An Increasingly Common Arrangement, 88 FAM. MATTERS (2011), 
available at http://www.aifs.gov.au/institute/pubs/fm2011/fm88/fm88f.html. For a discussion of the 
need to consult children, see PATRICK PARKINSON & JUDY CASHMORE, THE VOICE OF A CHILD IN 
FAMILY LAW DISPUTES (2009) (suggesting that there are both pros and cons of involving children 
directly and that in any event they should not be understood to make the decision). 
For a discussion of these and other Western European jurisdictions’ custody rules, see PATRICK 
PARKINSON, FAMILY LAW AND THE INDISSOLUBILITY OF PARENTHOOD 45-56 (2011). 
35. See, e.g., FATHERS AND DADS FOR EQUAL CUSTODY RIGHTS, 
http://www.fathersrights.org (last visited Dec. 6, 2015). One interesting statistic is that shared 
custody families more often involve boys than girls. Sons are slightly more likely than daughters to 
be living in a shared parenting family. Heather Juby, Celine Bourdais & Nicole Gratton, Sharing 
Roles, Sharing Custody, 67 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 157 (2005); Ed Spruijt & Vincent Duindam, Joint 
Physical Custody In The Netherlands And The Well Being Of Children. 51 J. DIV. & REMARRIAGE 
65, 72 (2010) (19% of the boys and 15% of the girls of 3,561 Dutch children surveyed lived in 
shared custody households); Melli & Brown, supra note 14, at 238 (of 598 surveyed families, 
35.7% of the mother custody families had only girls, compared to 30.9% of the shared placement 
families). 
36. See, e.g., Donald C. Hubin, Parental Rights and Due Process, 1 J.L. & FAM. STUD. 123, 
139 (1999). For one such argument, see Edward Kruk, Arguments for an Equal Parental 
Responsibility Presumption in Contested Child Custody, 40 AM. J. FAM. THERAPY 33 (2012) 
(British Columbian social worker). 
37. See, for example, the testimony for the Idaho Joint Custody Bill, Senate Bill 1379, 
introduced by the only female state senator, Edith Miller Klein, with favorable testimony from a 
women’s rights advocate. Klein successfully sponsored a resolution to eliminate all sex 
discrimination in Idaho law. A. Davis, Mrs. Edith Miller Klein: An Idaho Senator, BOISE CITY 
DEPT. OF ARTS & HIST. (Nov. 8, 2012), http://www.boiseartsandhistory.org/blog/2012/11/08/mrs-
edith-miller-klein-an-idaho-senator/. She and her husband had no children. Legal Pioneer, Former 
State Senator Klein Dies at 83, IDAHO SPOKESMAN-REVIEW (Jan. 2, 1999), 
https://news.google.com/newspapers?nid=1314&dat=19990102&id=tzUSAAAAIBAJ&sjid=7PED
AAAAIBAJ&pg=4830,899571&hl=en. 
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some amount of time (typically a quarter to a third) with each parent, 
wealthier noncustodial parents are particularly attracted to larger and 
especially equal parenting time shares.
38
 
Some states (among them the populous states of Florida,
39
 Illinois,
40
 
Massachusetts,
41
 Pennsylvania,
42
 Texas,
43
 and Washington
44
) do not 
38. See, e.g., Jessica Pearson & Nancy Thoennes, Supporting Children After Divorce: The 
Influence of Custody on Support Levels and Payments, 22 FAM. L.Q. 319, 320-21 (1988); Jana B. 
Singer & William L. Reynolds, A Dissent on Joint Custody, 47 MD. L. REV. 497, 517 (1988): 
Legislation skewed toward awards of joint custody increases the ability of the parent 
requesting joint custody to engage in this type of extortion. David Chambers has noted 
that “a parent who is not really interested in having joint custody may use the threat of 
demanding it as a tool to induce the other parent to make concessions on issues of 
property division and child support.” 
Arizona’s tables for parenting time credit begin at four days, with a 0.012 reduction, but do not 
become substantial percentages until 130 days (or about 35% of the time). 
39. FLA. STAT. ANN. § 61.30 (West, Westlaw through the 2015 First Reg. Sess. and Special 
A Sess. of the 24th Legis.). The statute provides in paragraph (1)(a): 
Notwithstanding the variance limitations of this section, the trier of fact shall order 
payment of child support which varies from the guideline amount as provided in 
paragraph (11)(b) whenever any of the children are required by court order or mediation 
agreement to spend a substantial amount of time with either parent. This requirement 
applies to any living arrangement, whether temporary or permanent.  
The state does have a shared custody presumption, FLA. STAT. ANN § 61.13(2)(c)(2) (West, 
Westlaw through the 2015 First Reg. Sess. and Special A Sess. of the 24th Legis.), but still requires 
a best interests determination by the court even if there is agreement. Sparks v. Sparks, 75 So. 3d 
861, 862 (Fla. App. 2011). 
40. 750 ILL. COMP. STAT. ANN. § 5/505 (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-487 of the 2015 
Reg. Sess.) (providing for specific percentages of supporting party’s net income based on number of 
children, to be varied only if inappropriate after considering the best interests of the child in light of 
various relevant factors (not including shared custody)). Illinois law contains no statutory 
presumption of equal parenting time even where the parents are awarded joint legal custody. ILL. 
COMP STAT. ANN. § 5/602.1(d) (West, Westlaw through P.A. 99-487 of the 2015 Reg. Sess.) 
(“Nothing within this section shall imply or presume that joint custody shall necessarily mean equal 
parenting time.”). 
41. MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 208 § 28 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 136 of the 2015 First 
Ann. Sess.) (allowing rebuttal of presumptive guideline amounts if unjust or inappropriate under the 
circumstances and written findings of the specific facts of the case justifying departure from the 
guidelines). MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. 208 § 31 (West, Westlaw through Chapter 136 of the 2015 
First Ann. Sess.) provides that “physical custody shall be shared by the parents in such a way as to 
assure a child frequent and continued contact with both parents.” 
42. 23 PA. STAT AND CONS. STAT. ANN. § 4322 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. 
Acts 1 to 61) (“There shall be a rebuttable presumption, in any judicial or expedited process, that the 
amount of the award which would result from the application of such guideline is the correct 
amount of support to be awarded. A written finding or specific finding on the record that the 
application of the guideline would be unjust or inappropriate in a particular case shall be sufficient 
to rebut the presumption in that case” if based upon “the reasonable needs of the child or spouse 
seeking support and the ability of the obligor to provide support, with primary emphasis on the net 
incomes and earning capacities of the parties, with allowable deviations for unusual needs, 
extraordinary expenses and other factors, such as the parties’ assets, as warrant special attention.”). 
Since 2010, Pennsylvania’s custody law provides that “it is public policy of this Commonwealth, 
9
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have an offset for shared parenting time. Others, such as Arizona,
45
 
when in the best interest of the child, to assure a reasonable and continuing contact of the child with 
both parents after a separation or dissolution of the marriage and the sharing of the rights and 
responsibilities of child rearing by both parents and continuing contact of the child or children with 
grandparents when a parent is deceased, divorced or separated.” However, shared parenting is just 
one of the options listed in 23 PA. CONS. STAT. ANN. § 5323 (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. 
Sess. Acts 1 to 61).  
43. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 154.121 (West, Westlaw through the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. 
of the 84th Legis.). (Section 154.123 does allow, in subsection (b)(4), variance based on “the 
amount of time of possession of and access to a child.”) The state does presume that shared 
parenting is in the child’s best interests. TEX. FAM. CODE ANN. § 153.001 (West, Westlaw through 
the end of the 2015 Reg. Sess. of the 84th Legis.), for the “public policy of this state” consists of 
“(1) assur[ing] that children will have frequent and continuing contact with parents who have shown 
the ability to act in the best interest of the child; (2) provid[ing] a safe, stable, and nonviolent 
environment for the child; and (3) encourag[ing] parents to share in the rights and duties of raising 
their child after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage.” 
44. Section 26.19.001 of the Washington Revised Code includes in the legislative intent and 
finding “[r]educing the adversarial nature of the proceedings by increasing voluntary settlements as 
a result of the greater predictability achieved by a uniform statewide child support schedule.” 
WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 26.19.001(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. Sess. and the 2015 
First, Second, and Third Special Sess.). 
The statute provides that “[t]he court shall make residential provisions for each child which 
encourage each parent to maintain a loving, stable, and nurturing relationship with the child, 
consistent with the child’s developmental level and the family’s social and economic 
circumstances.” WASH. REV. CODE ANN § 26.09.187(3) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Reg. 
Sess. and the 2015 First, Second, and Third Special Sess.). Further,  
The court may order that a child frequently alternate his or her residence between the 
households of the parents for brief and substantially equal intervals of time if such 
provision is in the best interests of the child. In determining whether such an 
arrangement is in the best interests of the child, the court may consider the parties 
geographic proximity to the extent necessary to ensure the ability to share performance 
of the parenting functions.”  
 §§ 26.09.187(3)(a)-(b). A 2009 Washington State study found that “46 percent of children of 
divorce, statewide, are ordered to spend a minimum of 35 percent parenting time with their 
biological fathers.” Bill Harrington, Giving Parents Equal Parenting Time by Law, SEATTLE TIMES 
(Feb. 25, 2009, 4:13 PM), http://seattletimes.com/html/opinion/
2008786615_opinb26harrington.html. 
45. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-320 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the 
First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015). Section (D)(8) provides that “[t]he duration of 
parenting time and related expenses” shall be one of the criteria. While Schedule A to the child 
support guidelines subtracts some percentage from the amount otherwise owed for various levels of 
parenting days (computed in six hour increments) up to 48.6% (for 182 days), Schedule B, in effect 
when custody is shared equally, subtracts the lower earning parent’s total amount due from the 
higher, and then divides the difference in two. If $2000 per month is owed, and only one parent has 
any earnings at all, this means the parent who would otherwise pay $2000 only pays $1000. Thus 
the biggest disadvantage is to lower earning parents when incomes are the most disparate. Further, 
while many states multiply the amount owed in order to recognize the duplicate fixed expenses 
when children are living in two households, Arizona uses the same total child support amount 
whether all overnights are with one parent or whether 50% of the time is spent in each parent’s 
household. See Douglas W. Allen & Margaret F. Brinig, Child Support Guidelines: The Good, the 
Bad, and the Ugly, 45 FAM. L.Q. 135 (2011). This means that the baseline amount available in 
shared parenting situations is lower.  
10
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California,
46
 Michigan,
47
 Oregon,
48
 and Virginia,
49
 do allow for offset. 
Arizona recently adopted a new parenting time statute, providing that “[c]onsistent with the child’s 
best interests . . . the court shall adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share legal 
decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting time.” ARIZ. 
REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02(B) (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the First Special 
Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015) (emphasis added).  
46. Section 4053(c) of the California Family Code provides, “The guideline takes into 
account each parent’s actual income and level of responsibility for the children.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 
4053(c) (Deering, LEXIS through the end of the 2015 Leg. Sess. (Chapter 807)). Section 4055 
provides for the guideline, and subdivision (b)(3) provides for a fractional multiplier that is the 
“approximate percentage of time that the high earner has or will have primary physical 
responsibility for the children compared to the other parent.” CAL. FAM. CODE § 4055 (Deering, 
LEXIS through the end of the 2015 Leg. Sess. (Chapter 807)). CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020(b) provides: 
The Legislature finds and declares that it is the public policy of this state to assure that 
children have frequent and continuing contact with both parents after the parents have 
separated or dissolved their marriage, or ended their relationship, and to encourage 
parents to share the rights and responsibilities of child rearing in order to effect this 
policy, except where the contact would not be in the best interest of the child, as 
provided in Section 3011.  
CAL. FAM. CODE § 3020 (Deering, LEXIS through the end of the 2015 Leg. Sess. (Chapter 807)). 
Subdivision (a) provides that safety of the child is the court’s primary concern. Subdivision (c) 
provides, “Where the policies set forth in subdivisions (a) and (b) of this section are in conflict, any 
court’s order regarding physical or legal custody or visitation shall be made in a manner that ensures 
the health, safety, and welfare of the child and the safety of all family members.”  
47. Section 3.03(A) of the 2013 Michigan Child Support Manual allows for adjustment based 
on parental time since “[p]resuming that as parents spend more time with their children they will 
directly contribute a greater share of the children’s expenses, a base support obligation needs to 
offset some of the costs and savings associated with time spent with each parent.” 2013 MICH. 
CHILD SUPPORT FORMULA MANUAL § 3.03(A) (Mich. State Court Admin. Office 2013), available 
at 
http://courts.mi.gov/Administration/SCAO/Resources/Documents/Publications/Manuals/focb/2013
MCSF.pdf. The (complicated) formula takes into account the approximate annual number of 
overnights spent with each parents as well as the two parents’ base support obligation. Id.  
The current Michigan statute, section 722.23 provides simply for a list of factors. MICH. COMP. 
LAWS ANN § 722.23 (West, Westlaw through P.A.2015, No. 202 of the 2015 Reg. Sess., 98th 
Legis.). The legislature is currently considering a presumptive joint custody statute. 
48. OR. REV. STAT. § 137-050-0700 (2013). The amount of time each parent spends with 
their children is factored into the calculation. A calculator is available online. Child Support 
Guidelines Calculator, OREGON DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, http://www.oregonchildsupport.gov/
calculator/index.shtml. While Oregon law is complex and requires parenting plans, joint custody is 
preferred under §107.101: 
It is the policy of this state to: (1) Assure minor children of frequent and continuing 
contact with parents who have shown the ability to act in the best interests of the child; 
(2) Encourage such parents to share in the rights and responsibilities of raising their 
children after the parents have separated or dissolved their marriage; (3) Encourage 
parents to develop their own parenting plan with the assistance of legal and mediation 
professionals, if necessary; (4) Grant parents and courts the widest discretion in 
developing a parenting plan; and (5) Consider the best interests of the child and the 
safety of the parties in developing a parenting plan. 
OR. REV. STAT. § 107.101 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). More than a third 
of Oregon divorces in 2002 involved joint custody. Douglas W. Allen and Margaret F. Brinig, Do 
Joint Parenting Laws Make Any Difference?, 8 J. EMPIRICAL LEG. STUD. 4 (2011). 
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No one has looked to date at the comparable percentages of custody 
awarded to or bargained for by each parent. This Article does not do so, 
except to note that custody is shared far more equally in Arizona, where 
shared parenting dramatically affects child support, than in Indiana. 
Nor does this Article take on the contentious issue of whether 
substantially shared parenting post-dissolution is beneficial for children. 
Clearly, parents are enormously invested in their children. It may be 
slightly less obvious that loss of custody involves real harm (not just 
pretended or imagined harm) to them.
50
 As two-parent families with 
loving parents are theoretically best for children, continuing 
relationships with two nurturing parents (biological or adoptive) who no 
longer live together is typically the second-best solution.
51
 
At this point, professionals contest more than just percentages. 
Some claim that “relationship” equals “parenting time,”52 and 
49. Section 20-108.2(G)(3)(c) of the Virginia Code provides for different calculations when a 
party has custody or visitation of a child or children for more than ninety days of the year. VA. 
CODE ANN. § 20-108.2 (G)(3)(c) (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). Custody 
shares are determined by dividing the number of days by 365. Shared support need means the 
presumptive guideline amount of needed support for the shared children using the schedule for the 
combined gross income of the parents and the number of shared children, multiplied by 1.4. The 
mother would then pay the shared support need times the father’s custody share plus the healthcare 
and childcare paid by mother times her income share. Subtracting the smaller from the larger may 
offset the two.  
Section 20-108.1 provides that the guideline amounts may be rebutted by subdivision (2) 
arrangements regarding custody of the children, including the cost of visitation travel. Section 20-
124.2(B) provides: 
In determining custody, the court shall give primary consideration to the best interests of 
the child. The court shall assure minor children of frequent and continuing contact with 
both parents, when appropriate, and encourage parents to share in the responsibilities of 
rearing their children. As between the parents, there shall be no presumption or inference 
of law in favor of either. The court shall give due regard to the primacy of the parent-
child relationship but may upon a showing by clear and convincing evidence that the 
best interest of the child would be served thereby award custody or visitation to any 
other person with a legitimate interest. The court may award joint custody or sole 
custody. 
VA. CODE ANN. § 20-124.2 (West, Westlaw through end of the 2015 Reg. Sess.). 
50. Brinig & Nock, supra note 19, at 54 (concluding noncustodial fathers, holding constant 
other factors, have a real and significant increase in depressive symptoms following a custody order 
giving it to the mother). 
51. See, e.g., Fehlberg et al., supra note 31 (“This paper starts from the viewpoint that 
evidence fully supports the benefit to children of having a meaningful relationship with both parents 
after separation.”). 
52. See, e.g., William V. Fabricius, et al., Parenting Time, Parent Conflict, Parent-Child 
Relationships, and Children’s Physical Health, in PARENTING PLAN EVALUATIONS: APPLIED 
RESEARCH FOR THE FAMILY COURT 188, 193-94 (Kathyrn F. Kuehnle & Leslie M. Drozds eds., 
Oxford University Press 2012) (noting time is a necessary ingredient for cultivating meaningful 
relationships); contra Paul R. Amato & Joan G. Gilbreth, Non-Resident Fathers And Children’s 
Wellbeing: A Meta-Analysis 61 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 557 (1999) (reviewing sixty-three studies on 
12
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“nurturing” necessarily involves overnight stays. Some claim the 
confusion caused by moving between two households outweighs the 
benefit, at least for some.
53
 There is debate about whether the 
“continuing relationship” with two nurturing parents trumps or is 
trumped by the child’s need for continuity and stability.54 Experts do not 
agree whether exceptions to alternating custody need to be made when 
it’s impracticable (say, for a nursing or infant child,55 or one with 
disabilities, or when a parent is in the military, or lives too far away, or 
both are poor).
56
 
Differences in gender regarding parenting
57
 and in the stability of 
marriage versus cohabitation
58
 remain even in Nordic countries with 
parent-child contact and children’s well-being, finding that quality of contact is more important than 
frequency of contact).  
53. See, e.g., Juliana M. Sobowlewski & Paul R. Amato, Parents’ Discord and Divorce, 
Parent-Child Relationships and Subjective Well-Being in Early Adulthood: Is Feeling Close to Two 
Parents Always Better than Feeling Close to One?, 85 SOC. FORCES 1105, 1118 (2007). 
54. One common place for this debate to play out is in “move away” cases. See, for example, 
the rule enunciated in a California case, In re Marriage of Burgess, 913 P.2d 473 (Cal. 1996). 
55. For arguments that shared parenting of infants involving overnights is not appropriate, 
see Jennifer McIntosh, et al., Post Separation Parenting Arrangements: Outcomes for Infants and 
Children, FAM. TRANSITIONS 16-19 (2010), available at https://www.ag.gov.au/
FamiliesAndMarriage/Families/FamilyViolence/Documents/Post%20separation%20parenting%20a
rrangements%20and%20developmental%20outcomes%20for%20infants%20and%20children.pdf. 
See also ROBERT E. EMERY, RENEGOTIATING FAMILY RELATIONSHIPS: DIVORCE, CHILD CUSTODY, 
AND MEDIATION 118-19 (Guilford Press, 2010)  
56. See, for example, Gerald W. Hardcastle, Joint Custody: A Family Court Judge’s 
Perspective, 32 FAM. L.Q. 201, 212-13 (1998): 
Further, joint custody is a more expensive proposition than sole custody. Joint custodians 
are each required to maintain suitable housing for children, with extra clothing and toys. 
It has been estimated that these expenditures constitute from one-fourth to one-third of 
the total child-related expenditures. Initially, there is the question of whether the costs 
associated with joint custody make such arrangements feasible for low-income families. 
One study noted that joint custody is not spreading very quickly to lower socio-economic 
populations. Reviewing the literature, one is left with the feeling that joint custody is an 
upper-middle class phenomenon. 
57. See INTERNATIONAL NETWORK ON LEAVE POLICIES AND RESEARCH, 10TH 
INTERNATIONAL REVIEW OF LEAVE POLICIES AND RELATED RESEARCH 2014 (Peter Moss ed., 
2014), available at http://www.leavenetwork.org/fileadmin/Leavenetwork/Annual_reviews/
2014_annual_review_korr.pdf.  
In all four cases, mothers continue to take more leave than fathers. The difference is 
greatest in Denmark, where statistics from 2010 and 2011 show that Danish fathers on 
average only took 7.2 per cent of the Parental leave period, followed by Norway, where 
fathers accounted for 18 per cent of Parental leave days taken in 2011, and Sweden, 
where fathers take about just under a quarter of all days (24 per cent) in 2011. The 
greatest share of paid leave taken by men, 33 per cent, is in Iceland, with its 3+3+3 leave 
scheme; mothers take both their individual entitlement and the greater part of the family 
entitlement.  
58. See Kathleen Kiernan, Childbearing Outside Marriage in Western Europe, 98 
POPULATION TRENDS 11 (1999); JOHN HOLMES & KATHLEEN KIERNEN, FRAGILE FAMILIES IN THE 
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substantial public support for childrearing by both parents, whether 
married or not. Similarly, it is quite well demonstrated that some 
dissolving families experience domestic violence either before parents 
separate or on a continuing basis.
59
 The proportion is disputed but seems 
to be higher among those who never married than the married.
60
 When 
children are exposed to violence, no one doubts that they are harmed.
61
 
Psychologists and sociologists write that families with a high degree of 
visible conflict are those in which children might even do better if their 
parents divorce than if they stay together.
62
 
III. AN EMPIRICAL TEST OF INEQUALITIES
A. Collecting the Data 
In this Article, I examine shared parenting in Arizona and Indiana. 
When I set about looking for particular jurisdictions in which to study 
the effect of preferences for shared parenting and child support laws, I 
had several criteria. First, I looked for a “modern” statute, that is, one 
that thought about post-separation parental roles in terms of parenting 
time. Second and relatedly, I wanted a state that for some time had 
parenting guidelines propounded by the judiciary to give additional 
guidance to judges making parenting time decisions. Third, I preferred to 
analyze states that had comparable child support guidelines, especially in 
UK: EVIDENCE FROM THE MILLENNIUM COHORT STUDY 1 (2010), available at 
https://www.york.ac.uk/media/spsw/documents/research-and-
publications/HolmesKiernan2010FragileFamiliesInTheUKMillenniumCohort.pdf (cohabiting 
families with children almost three times as likely to separate by the time the child reached aged 
five as similarly impoverished married families).  
59. See Shannon M. Catalano, Intimate Partner Violence, 1993-2010, U.S. DEP’T OF 
JUSTICE, 1-2 (Rev. Sep. 29, 2015), available at http://bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/ipv9310.pdf (showing 
single mother households experienced intimate partner violence at a rate more than ten times higher 
than those of married households).  
60. See, e.g., Amanda Berger, et. al., Relationship Violence Among Young Adult Couples, 
CHILD TRENDS RESEARCH BRIEF 3-4 (2012), available at http://www.childtrends.org/wp-
content/uploads/2012/06/Child_Trends-2012_06_01_RB_CoupleViolence.pdf (noting the highest 
level of domestic violence among cohabiting couples and the lowest among married couples, with 
45% of married couples and 52% of cohabiting couples experiencing any type of violence; 8% of 
married couples and 15% of cohabiting couples reported a resulting injury; discussing Spain and 
Great Britain as well). 
61. See, e.g., PAUL A. AMATO AND ALAN BOOTH, A GENERATION AT RISK: GROWING UP IN 
AN ERA OF FAMILY UPHEAVAL (Harvard University Press, 1997) (suggesting children are only 
better off if their parents had a highly conflictual marriage before divorce (30% of the time)). More 
recently, see EMERY, supra note 55 at 100 (“Hundreds of studies show that parental conflict is toxic 
for children in divorce.”).  
62. For some examples, see Alan Booth & Paul R. Amato, Parental Predivorce Relations 
and Offspring PostDivorce Well-Being, 63 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 197, 210 (2001). 
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the way they treated substantially shared parenting. Fourth, given the 
first criteria, I looked for states with substantial experience with shared 
parenting, that is, states likely to be above average in shared parenting 
awards, since this would minimize a selection effect into shared custody. 
And last, I needed states that would allow me remote access to electronic 
records. This required that the counties involved at least keep electronic 
records of not only judicial activity (or minute entries), but also scanned 
documents such as pleadings, reports, motions, and decisions and orders 
of judges, mediators, and so forth. The two states I ultimately chose 
were Arizona and Indiana. 
There are two kinds of court data involved in the study. The first is 
publicly available online
63
 and is simply a listing of transactions with the 
clerk’s office dealing with the file. The most important for analysis 
purposes is a subgrouping within the publically available file, a listing of 
the (minute) time scheduled with the judge or other decision-maker. This 
enables calculation of the relative litigiousness of the parents. 
The second kind of data was obtained after receiving Institutional 
Review Board approval and with assurances that individual records 
would be kept confidential. The data comprise the actual documents, 
such as pleadings and other motions, letters, reports, and orders, 
involved with each file selected above. These documents contain a host 
of information. Some documents are routine or appear in every case 
involving children. Such documents include affidavits of service of 
process, orders to complete parenting time education classes (and 
certifications when classes were attended), and motions and orders 
dealing with continuances of various trial dates. Some documents were 
quite routine but did not appear in every case, including motions and 
orders for return of evidence, cash receipts, calculations of arrearages by 
the Department of Economic Security (since the final numbers would 
always be found elsewhere), and orders of publication when respondents 
could not be located. The information I coded came from complaints and 
answers (or motions and responses), reports by child coordinators or of 
drug testing, completed parental worksheets for child support, parenting 
plans (joint or sole custody), and final dissolution orders (or orders 
63. Maricopa’s are found at, THE JUDICIAL BRANCH OF ARIZONA MARICOPA COUNTY,
http://www.superiorcourt.maricopa.gov/docket/FamilyCourtCases/ (last visited Feb. 5, 2016). 
Pima’s are found at, OFFICE OF THE CLERK OF THE SUPERIOR COURT, 
http://www.agave.cosc.pima.gov/home.asp?Include=pages/record_search.htm (last visited Feb. 5, 
2016). Most of the Indiana cases can be found at, INDIANA CASE-RECORDS SEARCH, 
https://public.courts.in.gov/mycase/#/vw/Search (last visited Feb. 6, 2016), though the Lake County 
files are at, LAKE COUNTY INDIANA, https://www.lakecountyin.org/portal/media-
type/html/user/anon/page/online-docket (last visited Feb. 6, 2016).  
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dealing with motions or protective orders). 
The complaint typically included names and birth dates of parents 
and any children, the date of marriage (if the parties were married), 
addresses, occupations of the parents, what property was owned by the 
couple and how the petitioner wanted it split, what parenting time was 
asked for, and whether spousal support or child support was sought. The 
complaint also indicated which party was bringing the action (father or, 
at least nominally, in the case of Title IVD support, mother) and whether 
there had been or currently was domestic violence. The answer 
corroborated or sometimes corrected the details found in the complaint, 
asking for the same or different things. 
The child support worksheets at the time of the dissolution or other 
order identified which parent was the primary custodial parent, the 
amount of each parent’s monthly income, whether or not either was 
responsible for additional or court ordered support for another child, 
whether the child was over 12 or had extraordinary expenses, who was 
ordered to pay child support, what the parenting time of the payor parent 
was (calculated by totaling the number of days or partial days), and 
whether the amount was adjusted because it exceeded the amount 
needed for self-support (in 2008, $775 monthly). 
Some cases involved temporary motions for support, requests for 
custody evaluations or mediation, discovery motions (which I usually 
ignored unless the total number of these was very large), actions 
involving protective orders and, if requested, the results of protective 
order hearings, and motions post dissolution (or order) to increase or 
decrease child support or parenting time or to enforce either. The 
motions were accompanied by supporting reasons, which were 
frequently referred to by the court in resolving them. The divorce 
decrees or parenting orders incorporated any agreements of the parties, 
which sometimes were attached and sometimes separately filed. These 
usually included parenting plans and sometimes included property 
settlement agreements. The stand-alone support orders included reasons 
for deviating from the amounts calculated on the worksheet (the state 
child support guideline amounts) and sometimes employer information 
(which was also sometimes included in a separate document). All of 
these alleged or found facts were carefully coded. 
1. Arizona and Presumptive Shared Parenting
The Arizona law in place at the beginning of my study was typical 
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of the laws in many states “friendly” to shared parenting.64 The state 
progressively moved in 2010
65
 and again in 2012
66
 toward mandating 
equal parenting time for all separating couples.
67
 Arizona, as a whole, 
even in 2007, had more equal parenting than most other jurisdictions.
68
 
Maricopa County, the most populous county in the state, led the way, 
64. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25–403.01 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the 
First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015), Sole and joint custody: 
A. In awarding child custody, the court may order sole custody or joint custody. This 
section does not create a presumption in favor of one custody arrangement over another. 
The court in determining custody shall not prefer a parent as custodian because of that 
parent’s sex. 
B. The court may issue an order for joint custody over the objection of one of the parents 
if the court makes specific written findings of why the order is in the child’s best 
interests. In determining whether joint custody is in the child’s best interests, the court 
shall consider the factors prescribed in section 25–403, subsection A and all of the 
following: 
1. The agreement or lack of an agreement by the parents regarding joint custody.
2. Whether a parent’s lack of agreement is unreasonable or is influenced by an issue not 
related to the best interests of the child. 
3. The past, present and future abilities of the parents to cooperate in decision-making 
about the child to the extent required by the order of joint custody. 
4. Whether the joint custody arrangement is logistically possible.
C. The court may issue an order for joint custody of a child if both parents agree and 
submit a written parenting plan and the court finds such an order is in the best interests 
of the child. The court may order joint legal custody without ordering joint physical 
custody. 
65. Arizona S.B. 1095, Chapter 186, § 2 (2010).
66. Arizona S.B. 1127, Chapter 309, § 8 (2012).
67. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.02 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the 
First. Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015) now includes in part: 
B. Consistent with the child’s best interests in § 25-403 and §§ 25-403.03, 25-403.04 and 
25-403.05, the court shall adopt a parenting plan that provides for both parents to share 
legal decision-making regarding their child and that maximizes their respective parenting 
time. The court shall not prefer a parent’s proposed plan because of the parent’s or 
child’s gender. 
68. See Patrick Parkinson, The Payoffs and Pitfalls of Laws that Encourage Shared 
Parenting: Lessons from the Australian Experience, 37 DALHOUSIE L.J. 301 (2014). North Carolina 
in 2006 had 15.3% of cases with at least 123 days of parenting time (33%), Reynolds et al., supra 
note 15, at 1667. Oregon, in 2002, had 32% of joint custody; MARGARET F. BRINIG, FAMILY, LAW 
AND COMMUNITY: SUPPORTING THE COVENANT 89 (2010); Wisconsin had 43.8% with at least 30% 
parenting time in 2007; JUDI BARTFELD, SHARED PLACEMENT: AN OVERVIEW OF PREVALENCE, 
TRENDS, ECONOMIC IMPLICATIONS, AND IMPACTS ON CHILD WELL-BEING 6 (2011); Washington in 
2007 had 16% equal and another 18% over 35%; THOMAS GEORGE, RESIDENTIAL TIME SUMMARY 
REPORTS FILED IN WASHINGTON JULY 2007-MARCH 2008, WASH. CTS. (2008), available at 
www.courts.wa.gov/wsccr/docs/ResidentialTimeSummaryReport.pdf. In 2007, Arizona had 15% 
equal custody and another 19% with at least 116 days. JAME VENOHR & RASA KAUNELIS, CTR. FOR 
POLICY RESEARCH, ARIZONA CHILD SUPPORT GUIDELINES REVIEW: ANALYSIS OF CASE FILE DATA 
4-5, 12 (2008), available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/74/CSGRC/repository/2009-
CaseFileRev.pdf.  
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and it still drives the state-level results.
69
 In other words, by imitating 
others, the majority of couples in Arizona not having trial-determined 
custody outcomes, chose some degree of shared parenting. Indeed, the 
most frequently occurring single outcome following family dissolution 
in Arizona, other than no overnights at all, was equal or nearly equal 
parenting time.
70
 Figure 1 reveals these outcomes, and it also shows 
peaks or concentrations at various other points, though these may be due 
to incentives driven by the shared custody deductions of the child 
support system. 
Figure 1: Maricopa County Parenting Time (482 Cases: 
Pooling) 
69. Because Maricopa’s population is so much larger than any other county in the state, its 
custody numbers drive the state averages. Pima’s (and presumably other counties’) are skewed to 
the left, the lower amounts. Pima’s totals were slightly different (added up to only 91%) because of 
a large number of cases in which no parenting time reduction was ordered. These do not show up on 
the figure (which begins at 4-20 days). 
70. The various spikes in the figure correspond, by definition, to frequently occurring 
parenting patterns. While the 182-day pattern is obvious (though it may be through alternating 
weeks or seasons, or 2-2-5-5 day patterns), the spike around 60 days accounts for traditional custody 
arrangements (every other weekend (52 days) plus one week during the summer (4.75 additional 
days)). The 104-day pattern is for one parent to have the children during the school week with the 
other living with them on weekends (or, in long distance situations, one having most of summer 
vacation plus the longer breaks during the school year). 
18
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The Court Administrator in Maricopa County, Arizona sent me the 
complete list of intake files from eight weeks in January-February, April, 
and September of 2008. These identified not only file names and the 
type of action involved, but also the names of parties, their addresses 
(where available), their counsel (or whether, like most couples, they 
were self-representing, or “pro per” as it is called there), and very often 
their dates of birth. From these I randomly selected files representing 
specific types of actions,
71
 with the following results: 
Table 1. Types of Cases, Maricopa County, Arizona 
Frequency Percent Cumulative 
Percent 
Dissolution with Children 
Dissolution without 
Children 
Legal Separation 
Custody 
Protective Order 
Support 
Total 
363 58.5 58.5 
51 8.2 66.8 
7 1.1 67.9 
43 6.9 74.8 
1 .2 75.0 
155 25.0 100.0 
620 100.0 
Most of the legal separations eventually were changed by one of the 
spouses to a final dissolution. The one protective order case was not 
analyzed further, though there were protective orders that were part of 
71. Please note that while I selected files randomly, I did not attempt to match the actual 
proportion of files in the sample. Thus while my contrasts within and between groups does not 
present statistical issues, I am sure that it is not representative of all the cases involving children 
decided in Maricopa, for instance. The sample underrepresented the population of divorces with 
children among this group (62.6% compared with 73% in the intake weeks represented), slightly 
underrepresented the unmarried custody cases (7.37% compared to 9.7% in the intake weeks 
represented) and substantially overrepresented the establishment of support group (27.7% compared 
to 17% in the weeks intake represented). 
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each of the other types of cases. Some of these cases were dismissed at 
various points and for various reasons. Seventeen couples reconciled and 
voluntarily dismissed the actions. A perhaps overlapping group of 28 
couples had their cases dismissed by the court for failure to prosecute. A 
third group of 16 couples involved absent parents or children and 
therefore a lack of jurisdiction to decide custody and/or support issues. 
All these were dropped from further analysis. 
The Arizona child support guidelines explicitly defined and still 
define
72
 how to count days or partial days for parenting time.
73
 Once the 
total is determined, a table in the guidelines
74
 reveals what percentage of 
the obligation should be reduced to obtain preliminary child support 
owed. For example, the traditional, or “basic,” parenting plan would be 
for the child to spend every other weekend plus one evening during the 
week plus split holidays plus two weeks in the summer with the non-
primary parent. While many parents use a software calculator 
(obtainable as a free download) for this, the plan would include 52 (for 
the weekends) + 3 (12 x .25, for one mid-week evening a week) + 5 (for 
holidays) + 12 (for summer, two weeks less the weekend already 
counted) = 72 days, or a 10.5% reduction in the support that would 
otherwise have been awarded. A separate table known as Appendix B 
equates the total support obligation borne (or imputed) to each parent 
when parenting time is equal.
75
 
72 Arizona Supreme Court, Administrative Order 2010-116, Adoption of Revisions to the Arizona 
Child Support Guidelines §§ 3, 20 (2010) (adopting revised Arizona Child Support Guidelines, 
effective June 1, 2011), available at http://www.azcourts.gov/Portals/22/admorder/Orders10/2010-
116.pdf. 
73. Arizona Supreme Court, Arizona Child Support Guidelines 10 (2005) [hereinafter 2005 
Guidelines] (adopting revised Arizona Child Support Guidelines, effective Jan. 1, 2005), available 
at https://www.dshs.wa.gov/sites/default/files/ESA/dcs/documents/csg2004.pdf.  
A. Each block of time begins and ends when the noncustodial parent receives or returns 
the child from the custodial parent or from a third party with whom the custodial parent 
left the child. Third party includes, for example, a school or childcare provider. 
B. Count one day of parenting time for each 24 hours within any block of time. 
C. To the extent there is a period of less than 24 hours remaining in the block of time, 
after all 24-hour days are counted or for any block of time which is in total less than 24 
hours in duration: 
1. A period of 12 hours or more counts as one day.
2. A period of 6 to 11 hours counts as a half-day.
3. A period of 3 to 5 hours counts as a quarter-day.
4. Periods of less than 3 hours may count as a quarter-day if, during those hours, 
the noncustodial parent pays for routine expenses of the child, such as meals. 
74. Id. at 11. 
75. Id. at Appendix A. The simplest way of thinking about this is to subtract the smaller 
amount due from each parent from the larger one and divide by 2. 
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I replicated the Maricopa process, including the relative proportion 
of case types, first in Pima County, Arizona, and then in Indiana. 
2. Indiana’s Approach to Shared Parenting
Obtaining the Indiana records required me to gain a court order 
from the Indiana Supreme Court, and I used five counties scattered 
around the state to permit consideration of different demographics: 
urban and rural, prosperous and poor, racially diverse and not.
76
 I 
utilized the same months from 2008 obtained from Arizona, including 
smaller numbers of unmarried couples. The state demographics, as 
shown in Table 2, are not dissimilar: 
Table 2: Arizona and Indiana State Demographics 
Arizona Indiana 
Hispanic population 29.3% 12.4% 
Black population 4% 19% (27.6 in Marion 
and 25.3 in Lake 
Counties) 
Already Divorced 6% 15% 
Foreign Born 14% 6% 
Median Household 
Income 
$55,862 $42,714 
High school graduates 78% 86% 
76. The counties are Lake (Gary and Crown Point), Marion (Indianapolis), Monroe 
(Bloomington), Posey (Evansville) and St. Joseph (South Bend). 
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Figure 2: Counties Supplying Indiana Data 
However, while both states have both child custody and child 
support guidelines, Indiana’s guidelines differ from Arizona’s, 
suggesting meaningful contact with both parents based upon the age of 
the child rather than “maximum contact with both.” The difference is not 
semantic only: there is far less equally shared parenting time among 
divorcing Indiana couples, and the bulk of parenting days in Indiana are 
in the 20-128 days per year range, (mean 72.47 days) as opposed to 47-
163 days (mean 105 days) for comparable divorcing parents in Arizona. 
Child support when there is shared parenting is computed 
differently as well. In Arizona, the base amount is typically reduced by a 
“parenting time deduction” ranging from 1% to 48.6%. In Indiana, the 
base amount is first multiplied by 1.4, and then the reductions credit only 
the variable as opposed to the fixed costs of parenting. Further, a finding 
of domestic violence in Arizona means a presumption against shared 
legal custody (decision-making), while in Indiana, and most other states, 
it would preclude shared physical custody (parenting time). 
22
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Descriptive statistics from the most often utilized subsets (divorces 
with children) from the two states follow in Table 3. 
Table 3: Descriptive Statistics Arizona and Indiana Divorces with 
Children 
Arizona Indiana 
N 
AZ/IN 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Mean Std. 
Deviation 
Joint legal 
custody 
685/310 .540 .4987 .519 .5004 
Monthly 
gross 
income 
mother 
608/225 $2450.2878 1961.72416 $2068.98 1344.06 
Monthly 
gross 
income 
father 
609/225 $4071.5681 3602.57535 $2498.19 1974.6346 
Spousal 
support to 
mother—
amount 
101/12 $1271.3129 1228.81647 $261.60 231.719 
Days of 
parenting 
time 
567/203 105.002 57.9731 74.682 54.8622 
Mediator 
involved 
685/310 .251 .4340 .210 .4077 
Dissolution 
after default 
685/310 .385 .4870 .123 .3285 
Dissolution 
by consent 
decree 
685/310 .336 .4726 .526 .5001 
Dissolution 
after trial 
685/310 .142 .3489 .077 .2677 
Post-order 
protective 
order 
685/310 .072 .2579 .035 .1853 
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Further, to the extent that racial and cultural groups, or lower 
income families, are disadvantaged by particular parenting 
arrangements, the exacerbation of income inequalities might present a 
major problem, both currently and critically a generation down the 
line.
77
 This type of systemic risk is what some of the results in both 
states seem to portend.
78
 
B. Assessing the Results: Income-Generated Inequality 
Even a preliminary examination of these 2008 and later court 
documents reveals at least two very large groupings. The first shows a 
world involving divorcing, relatively wealthy parents, with the mother’s 
income at or higher than 50% of the couples in the study ($2081.66 a 
month). For these wealthier once-married parents, in Arizona, 25% 
indicate that they have equal custody, and the average parenting time 
adjustment
79
 exceeds 116 days a year, or 31.7% of the total time.
80
 The 
norm for these parents is clearly to share custody, and, in those cases 
equaling or exceeding the median income of mothers,
81
 substantial 
parenting time is quite routine. The marriages usually dissolve by 
consent decree, so that 43.9% had agreed-upon orders that both 
77. For a discussion of this problem in the context of marriage, see CARBONE & CAHN, supra 
note 11. 
78. Depending upon the success of shared parenting, there may be a risk from its underuse by 
less advantaged or cultural minority families. That is, if children of separating parents do much 
better when their parents share parenting, whole groups of children are at risk. On the other hand, if 
income inequality between parents presents special problems for equal-parenting separated couples 
because of faulty assumptions behind the child support guidelines, there could be another unhappy 
systemic effect that would only be worth the cost if the benefits of co-parenting outweighed the 
documented risks of growing up (at least partially) in poverty. As far as I know, no research has 
been done on growing up in two households, one of which is far poorer than the other. This result 
was certainly not the goal of the child support guidelines and in some jurisdictions (Canada, for 
example) is expressly what is being avoided by very generous awards to the lower income parent. 
See Allen & Brinig, supra note 45, at 146-47. 
79. More than 94% of the child support worksheets indicated such an adjustment.
80. In other states favoring shared parenting, anything over 25% would count as substantial 
sharing. See, e.g., MINN. REV. STAT. ANN. § 518.175(g) (West, Westlaw through end of 2015 First 
Special Sess.) (“In the absence of other evidence, there is a rebuttable presumption that a parent is 
entitled to receive at least 25 percent of the parenting time for the child.”). 
81. There were several reasons to consider the income of mothers rather than fathers. First, in 
cases with very low maternal income and high paternal income, it would be unusual not to have a 
primary caretaker. Second, I knew that maternal, but not paternal, income was related to parenting 
time. Third, using the total child support amount would be misleading because there were frequently 
deductions from income for other children supported by mothers and/or fathers. The gross income 
figures eliminated this concern. 
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dissolved the marriage and set custody. They did not often have post-
decree court modifications—74.8% had one or no appearances.82 
For less wealthy, married Arizona parents (those with less than the 
median mother’s income), only 16.8% featured equal custody, and the 
average amount of parenting time enjoyed by the parent without primary 
custody is just over 93 days, or 25.4% of the time (with a reduction in 
child support of 26.1%). The pattern of divorce was different as well, 
reversing the practice of the wealthier parents. The predominating 
dissolution (45%) was by default.
83
Figure 3: Parenting Time Versus Income in Indiana. 
82. The corresponding number for the lower income married couples was 81.3%, though the 
single most litigious, with 25 court entries following dissolution, was in this group. 
83. Default dissolutions occur when the other party is served but does not contest, or is 
reached only by publication. In default dissolutions, the petitioner is granted whatever was 
established in the complaint (or has been agreed to previously by the other). Consent dissolutions 
constituted only 25%, and dissolutions by decree again were slightly less than 14%. 
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Figure 4: Parenting Time, High- and Low-Income Fathers, Arizona 
Table 4: Arizona Income and Dissolution Type 
Default Consent 
Decree 
Trial 
High 
income 
Mean 319 .395 .141 
N 382 382 382 
Low 
income 
Mean 469 .261 .142 
N 303 303 303 
Total 
Mean 385 .336 .142 
N 685 685 685 
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What we cannot know from the data (and would probably take 
ethnographic research) is whether the disparity of custody outcomes 
based upon wealth, marital status, or ethnicity stems from a lack of 
education about the benefits of shared parenting or a parenting plan,
84
 a 
lack of expertise in filling out the forms (since most were dissolution 
decrees), failure to undergo a bargaining process, or simply the 
infeasibility of frequent overnight stays at the second parent’s home. 
C. Marital Status Inequality 
The difference becomes yet starker for unmarried parents. Again, 
there are two groups. One involves actions to establish support, which 
are usually (though not always) initiated by the state to collect arrearages 
or reimbursement for public assistance. In these cases,
85
 the median (and 
mode, or most frequently recurring amount) mother’s income was $1196 
per month, not coincidentally that attributable to minimum wage (the 
figure utilized to calculate TANF, or public assistance). Only 3 or 2% of 
these couples, indicated equal parenting. Further, only 34% of these 
couples indicated any parenting time adjustment to child support at all 
(meaning that many were zeros in Figure 1), and the average amount for 
this third was 77 days only, or slightly more than 20% of the time 
(justifying a reduction of 10.5% in child support). 
The other unmarried group involved actions for custody, parenting 
time, and support. Fathers most often brought these suits, and many had 
established paternity through the hospital’s paternity program and had 
been listed on the child’s birth certificate. While they were not 
wealthy—the mother’s median income was $1500 a month—more than 
71% of the parents had an adjustment for parenting time on the 
worksheets, and parenting time averaged 101 days (both figures higher 
than those for the lower-income, married parents). These are, by 
definition, involved or at least motivated fathers, and at least some 
84. Both Supreme Court cases and recent federal legislation suggest that if the opportunity 
was made readily available, it would be “grasped” by what would otherwise be noncustodial 
parents. Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 262 (1983). The significance of the biological connection 
is that it offers the natural father an opportunity that no other male possesses to develop a 
relationship with his offspring. If he grasps that opportunity and accepts some measure of 
responsibility for the child’s future, he may enjoy the blessings of the parent-child relationship and 
make uniquely valuable contributions to the child’s development. If he fails to do so, the Federal 
Constitution will not automatically compel a State to listen to his opinion of where the child’s best 
interests lie. Id. Stacy Brustin, Child Support: Shifting the Financial Burden in Low-Income 
Families, 20 GEO. J. ON POV. L. & POL’Y 1 (2012); SUPPORTING AT-RISK CHILDREN ACT, S. 1870, 
113th Cong. (2013).  
85. In the figures reported for marital status, the data comes from Maricopa County only.
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indicated long-standing relationships, one even of 12 years. While they 
were not divorcing, and so were not filing the associated forms, they 
were active following initial custody decrees, with more than half having 
two or more court appearances and one “outlier” boasting, if that is the 
right word, 33 court appearances. As Pruett and DiFonzo summarize the 
literature, they express concern about applying studies of formerly-
married parents to this group of never-married parents, who may be 
quite different.
86
 
Cohabiting relationships are far more likely than married 
relationships to break up even when couples have children.
87
 Research 
has revealed that African-American fathers are more involved in 
paternal childcare than European-American fathers.
88
 The larger the 
share of childcare that is performed by the father when the couple 
resides together, the greater his engagement post separation, though 
none of the other traditional values affected engagement.
89
 
86. Pruett & DiFonzo, supra note 10, at 155-56, 162, 166. 
87. See Cynthia Osborne, Wendy D. Manning & Pamela J. Smock, Married and Cohabiting 
Parents’ Relationship Stability: A Focus on Race and Ethnicity, 69 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 1345-66 
(2007). 
88. Susan Sanderson. & Vetta L. Thompson Sanders, Factors Associated with Perceived 
Paternal Involvement in Childrearing, 46 SEX ROLES: J. RESEARCH 99, 100-02 (2002). 
89. Linda Laughlin, Danielle Farrik & Jay Gagan, Father Involvement with Children 
Following Marital and Non-Marital Separations, 7 FATHERING 226, 239 (2009) (using data from 
the Fragile Families study). 
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Figure 5: Custody and Marital Status 
D. Inequality of Race and Ethnicity 
African-American fathers are more likely to be involved with 
parenting than other fathers. Research has revealed that African-
American fathers are more involved in paternal child-care than 
European-American fathers.
90
 Linda Laughlin et al. found that African-
American fathers were 1.18 times more likely to have frequent contact 
with their children following separation than European-American 
fathers, while Hispanic fathers were 0.63 times as likely as European-
American fathers.
91
 Kidane and Vargas show, with recent time diary 
data, that Hispanic fathers, whether never married or nonmarried, do 
significantly less “primary” childcare with children, and African-
American fathers do more primary childcare than do non-Hispanic 
Whites.
92
 
90. Susan Rich, A Study of African-American Fathers’ Involvement with Their Preschool 
Children, SETON HALL UNIVERSITY DISSERTATIONS AND THESES 46-47, 63-65, 71-72 (2002), 
available at http://scholarship.shu.edu/dissertations/121/; see also Waldo E. Johnson, Jr., Paternal 
Involvement in Fragile African-American Families: Implications for Clinic Social Work Practice, 
68 SMITH C. STUD. SOC. WORK 215, 220 (1998).  
91. Laughlin et al., supra note 89, at 241. 
92. Daniel Kidane & Andres J. Vargas, The Quality of Time Spent with Children among 
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To the extent that that value of meaningful contact with both 
parents is important, it is not being shared by parents of Hispanic 
origin.
93
 Table 5 indicates
94
 that this difference (in parenting days) 
persists even when income is included in simple regression analysis and 
is nearly as strong as the income effect I have discussed previously. 
While there were not enough Hispanics in the Indiana sample to 
make such a claim, and race could not usually be known directly from 
the data in the file,
95
 inferences could be drawn to the extent that the 
census tract in which a spouse lived was largely nonwhite.
96
 The 
parenting days were different: the probably nonwhite noncustodial 
parents had a mean of 64.74 days compared to 76.47 days for those who 
were probably whites, though this did not reach statistical significance. 
Solangel Maldonado’s work indicates that African American 
fathers may substitute goods for child support, and also that they may do 
significant childcare following separation.
97
 To the extent they do so, 
they may be in arrears on their child support. Further recent federal 
legislation designed to promote collection of child support especially by 
public assistance authorities
98
 may create the perverse incentives for 
Mexican Immigrants 15-17, 27-28 (2014), available at 
http://www.popcenter.umd.edu/research/sponsored-events/timeuse-
2014/tu2014_papers/kidane_vargas/at_download/file. (Blacks). The differences change with 
assimilation and with successive generations since immigration and come from the American Time 
Use Survey 2003-2010. Bureau of Labor Statistics, American Time Use Survey (ATUS), 2003-2010, 
available at https://fcsm.sites.usa.gov/files/2014/05/Dixon_2012FCSM_X-C.pdf (last visited Jan. 
31, 2016). 
93. We identified as Hispanic those cases in which one or the other of the parents still had 
homes in Mexico, was currently living there, or had married there. In others, the divorce records had 
forms answered in Spanish, or featured hearings requiring a Spanish language interpreter. In some 
of those with protective orders or bench warrants, the assailant or victim was identified as Hispanic 
in police reports. Finally, in some we followed Census methods, using the probabilities from the list 
of most common Hispanic surnames weighted by the Hispanic percentage population in the census 
tract. 
94. In the Maricopa divorce sample, 14% had equal custody compared to nearly 20% for the 
non-Hispanic sample. Even for the non-equal parenting plans, the Hispanic numbers were far (and 
statistically significantly) lower: 95.53 days compared to 115.28 for non-Hispanics. 
95. The exceptions were when the parties self-identified in the pleadings or when there were 
warrants issued for protective orders or delinquent child support. 
96. My cutoff was that the white population had to be 38% or less of the total.
97. Maldonado, supra note 18. 
98. The Preventing Sex Trafficking and Strengthening Families Act, S.B. 1870, 113th Cong. 
(2013) provides: 
SEC. 303. SENSE OF THE CONGRESS REGARDING OFFERING OF 
VOLUNTARY PARENTING TIME ARRANGEMENTS. 
(a) Findings.—The Congress finds as follows: 
(1) The separation of a child from a parent does not end the financial or other 
responsibilities of the parent toward the child. 
30
Akron Law Review, Vol. 49 [2015], Iss. 2, Art. 10
http://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol49/iss2/10
2016] RESULT INEQUALITY IN FAMILY LAW 501 
mothers who do not want formal orders entered against their children’s 
fathers that will simply reimburse TANF payments and may subject 
them to claims for custody. It may also exacerbate inequality, since non-
TANF (relatively “wealthy”) unwed mothers will perhaps not ask for 
child support and therefore won’t have to have visitation orders. 
(2) Increased parental access and visitation not only improve parent-child relationships 
and outcomes for children, but also have been demonstrated to result in improved child 
support collections, which creates a double win for children—a more engaged parent and 
improved financial security. 
(b) Sense Of The Congress.—It is the sense of the Congress that— 
(1) establishing parenting time arrangements when obtaining child support orders is an 
important goal which should be accompanied by strong family violence safeguards; and 
(2) States should use existing funding sources to support the establishment of parenting 
time arrangements, including child support incentives, Access and Visitation Grants, and 
Healthy Marriage Promotion and Responsible Fatherhood Grants. 
The legislation that was enacted is not as strong as DHS 2015, the Administration’s fatherhood and 
child support budget proposals: The budget includes a set of proposals to encourage states to pay 
child support collections to families rather than retaining those payments. This effort includes a 
proposal to encourage states to provide all current monthly child support collections to Temporary 
Assistance for Needy Families (TANF) recipients. Recognizing that healthy families need more 
than just financial support alone, the proposal requires states to include provisions in initial child 
support orders addressing parenting time responsibilities, to increase resources to support and 
facilitate non-custodial parents’ access to and visitation with their children, and to implement 
domestic violence safeguards. See Testimony, U.S. DEPT. OF HEALTH & HUMAN SERVS. (March 12, 
2014) (statement by Kathleen Sebelius), available at http://www.hhs.gov/asl/testify/
2014/03/t20140312b.html.  
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Figure 6: Arizona Parenting Time and Hispanic/Non-Hispanic
Table 5. Days of Parenting Time for Hispanic and non-Hispanic Residents. 
Model 
Unstandardized 
Coefficients 
(Std. Error) 
Standardized 
Coefficients 
t Sig. 
1 (Constant) 106.492 (5.168) 20.606 .000 
Either has Hispanic 
surname 
-18.509 (6.955) -.155 -2.661 .008 
Mother’s gross income .003 (.001) .158 2.714 .007 
E. Inequality: Domestic Violence 
In a simple binomial regression for the Arizona divorces, the more 
equal the parenting time (by the number of days of adjustment in child 
support), the more likely there was to be a post-order protective order 
request, holding constant median household income in the census tract 
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and whether or not the parties were represented. Table 6 shows the 
correlation results with their significant coefficient (at p < .023). The 
results for Indiana are not displayed, since they were not statistically 
significant, likely because either (1) prior domestic violence legally 
contraindicates shared parenting in that state; or (2) perhaps Indiana does 
a better job of screening for it. 
What conclusions can be drawn from the fact that the decree type 
differs by income? The default decree is awarded to a plaintiff who has 
served the defendant but who does not answer the pleadings. While they 
may have some agreement (and typically have already divided the 
property), the parenting arrangement is determined entirely by the 
plaintiff. (In Arizona, a number of easily available forms are typically 
used, giving various possible custody arrangements). In Indiana, the 
default divorce is associated with a far lower (and statistically 
significant) number of parenting days: 51 days for default decrees and 
85.5 days average for others (trial and consent decrees), and much more 
sole decision-making (sole legal custody): 36.7% versus 65.6%. The 
results in Indiana are strikingly similar: for parenting days, default 
decrees had 89.6 days compared to 114.5 for other types of dissolutions; 
for joint legal custody, 37.9% compared to 64.1%. Mothers filed for 
divorce in 70% of the default cases in Arizona and 80% in Indiana. This 
means that fathers had less decision-making and were entitled to less 
contact with their children, exactly the results that programs like the 
Administration’s Fatherhood Initiative seek to achieve. 
Table 6: Correlation Between Parenting Time and Post-Decree Domestic 
Violence in Arizona 
Correlation Arizona Parenting Time and Post-Decree Protective 
Orders 
Post-Decree 
Protective Order 
Days of parenting time 
for noncustodial parent 
Pearson Correlation .095
*
 
Sig. (2-tailed) .023 
N 567 
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Additionally, in the Arizona custody context, the kind of troubling 
outcomes over time discussed by Carbone and Cahn may well be what 
eventuates with the latest version of the state’s custody statute. This 
statute requires the judge to order a parenting plan that maximizes the 
parenting time for both parents. In order to deviate from the statute, the 
judge would presumably have to list specific reasons under the other 
sections (such as substance abuse) that such an order is not appropriate.
99
 
While Arizona law restricts joint legal decision-making (joint legal 
custody) in cases of domestic violence, a finding that domestic violence 
occurred does not necessarily affect the decision that the parties should 
share parenting time. A decision affecting parenting time would require 
a high cost—in terms of court time, legal fees, missed work and 
emotional energy,
100
 and additional hearings. It would also require a 
finding that substantial parenting time would endanger the child.
101
 In 
modern pluralistic families, a variety of parenting arrangements better 
accommodates. 
IV. CONCLUSION
The data show that a decision to implement shared parenting can be 
particularly troublesome (and unstable) in cases involving indications of 
domestic violence and/or substance abuse as well as in cases involving 
the lower half of family incomes. The data also reveal the disparities 
among the increasing number of unmarried couples affected by custody 
and child support orders. The sum of these findings suggests that the 
way shared parenting has been implemented by presumption in Arizona 
has led to many mistakes. Further, because shared or equal parenting is 
being forced on some families, despite domestic violence issues, and on 
couples who are deeply conflicted to the point they cannot co-parent 
99. ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403(B) (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the 
First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015) provides, “In a contested legal decision-making or par-
enting time case, the court shall make specific findings on the record about all relevant factors and 
the reasons for which the decision is in the best interests of the child.” 
 100.  See Robert H. Mnookin & Lewis Kornhauser, Bargaining in the Shadow of the Law, 88 
The Yale L.J. 950, 971-72 (1979).  
 101.  ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-403.01 (West, Westlaw through the First Reg. Sess. and the 
First Special Sess. of the 52nd Legis. 2015) provides: 
D. A parent who is not granted sole or joint legal decision-making is entitled to 
reasonable parenting time to ensure that the minor child has substantial, frequent, 
meaningful and continuing contact with the parent unless the court finds, after a hearing, 
that parenting time would endanger the child’s physical, mental, moral or emotional 
health. 
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effectively, some children are being exposed to exactly the drawn-out 
situation psychologists feel is most likely to harm them. 
Signs that courts were dealing with the less favorable of these types 
of families might indicate that, absent an agreement, a court should not 
award equal or even substantially shared parenting.
102
 A number of prior 
studies, most notably the recent one done by Melli and Brown in 
Wisconsin,
103
 indicate that equal or substantially shared parenting is 
most common in wealthy couples.
104
 On the contrary, many jurisdictions 
disallow substantial custody to be awarded to the perpetrator of domestic 
violence,
105
 while most place substantial restrictions or supervision 
requirements on parents who abuse substances or whose mental illness 
may endanger them or the child.
106
 Even many advocates of shared 
parenting in general hesitate to endorse it when children are infants.
107
 
These exceptions should be considered and dealt with overtly in child 
custody or shared parenting guidelines implemented by states. 
Other policy suggestions arising from the data include that child 
support guidelines should take the duplication of resources into account. 
 102.  See, e.g., Peter Jaffe, A Presumption Against Shared Parenting for Family Court Liti-
gants, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 187, 188, 191 (2014). 
 103.  Melli & Brown, supra note 14; BARTFELD, supra note 68. See also Reynolds et al., supra 
note 15. 
 104.  There is also evidence that parents with substantially higher education may favor equal or 
joint parenting, though this characteristic is highly correlated with income. 
 105.  See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 9-13-101(c)(2) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Reg. Sess. 
and 2015 First Ex. Sess. of the 90th Ark. Gen. Ass.); Idaho Code § 32-717B(5) (West, Westlaw 
through 2015 Reg, Sess. and First Ex. Sess. of the 63rd Legis.); MINN. STAT. ANN. § 
518.17(1)(a)(4) (West, Westlaw through the 2015 Special Sess.). 
 106.  See, e.g., WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.41(5)(am)(14) (West, Westlaw through 2015 Act 60, 
published Aug. 13, 2015) 
107.  See Pruett & DiFonzio, supra note 10, at 163:  
Embedded within the shared parenting research is a hotbed of controversy on the ques-
tion of overnights for fathers with very young children who do not primarily reside with 
them. As indicated, early paternal involvement serves as a protective factor for later fa-
ther-child relationships. Yet the primacy of attachment research paradigms for mapping 
the pathway to healthy development has led to dyadic considerations of security and sta-
bility that have, until very recently, excluded the father or other caregiver. The emphasis 
on assisting parents through a conflict-laden transition, while their children’s brains and 
minds are developing rapidly and in need of consistent nurturance and support in order 
to develop physiological and biological regulation and trust in the world around them, 
can pit the uncoupling family’s dynamics in direct opposition to the child’s capacities 
and needs. 
See also Jennifer E. McIntosh, Marsha Kline Pruett & Joan B. Kelly, Parental Separation and 
Overnight Care of Young Children, Part II: Putting Theory into Practice, 52 FAM. CT. REV. 256 
(2014) (suggesting that for young children the decision needs to be individualized); Indiana Parent-
ing Time Guidelines, INDIANA RULES OF COURT, (2013), available at http://www.in.gov/judiciary/
rules/parenting/parenting.pdf. Some of the debate among researchers seems to emanate from differ-
ences in their belief in attachment theory. 
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Some states do this easily with multipliers.
108
 Child support orders in 
cases in which both parents have high levels of responsibility for the 
children should also reflect the increased costs of raising the children in 
two homes and should minimize significant disparities in the children’s 
living standards in the two homes. The alternative is to directly account 
for fixed and variable costs.
109
 Statutes that do not take these differences 
into account create perverse incentives, especially for wealthy fathers 
with homemaker wives.
110
 The findings here suggest that lower 
resourced counties like Pima, with Tucson, which are in the bottom five 
urban areas nationally, may not be able to make good determinations 
regarding domestic violence or adequate provisions for victims’ safety. 
At least in such places, if federal or state funds are not provided for 
better screening, it should be easier to rebut presumptions in favor of 
shared parenting. 
Less direct suggestions include support of and encouragement of 
childcare or other in-kind provision of services that will promote 
cooperation and contact, where appropriate, in low-income families, in 
lieu of some or all portions of the child support award. Finally, this 
paper provides more evidence for strengthening neighborhood social 
capital, particularly in urban central cities.
111
 
 108.  See, e.g., Virginia, VA. CODE ANN. § 20-108.2(G)(3)(a) (West, Westlaw through 2015 
Reg. Sess.) (if parenting time over 90 days); California, CAL. FAM. CODE § 4053(g) (Deering, 
LEXIS through 2015 Reg. Sess.).  
 109.  Indiana’s child support guidelines do this. Indiana Parenting Time Guidelines, supra note 
107. See generally Marygold S. Melli & Patricia R. Brown, The Economics of Shared Custody: 
Developing an Equitable Formula for Dual Residence, 31 HOUSTON L. REV. 544 (1994).  
 110.  Illinois just differentiates from its percentage of income for payor parent formula on a 
case-by-case basis, 750 ILCS 5/ 505(a)(3), while New York continues to use the pro-rate share gen-
erally devoted to child support (17% for one child, 25% for two, etc.). 
 111.  See generally MARGARET F. BRINIG & NICOLE STELLE GARNETT, LOST CLASSROOM, 
LOST COMMUNITY: CATHOLIC SCHOOLS’ IMPORTANCE IN URBAN AMERICA (2014) (finding when 
neighborhood institutions like Catholic schools close, social capital declines, eventually causing 
increased crime). 
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